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Abstract
Background: Empathy is a basic human ability with affective and cognitive
facets and high interindividual variability. Accurately detecting one's internal body
signals (interoceptive sensitivity) strongly contributes to the awareness of oneself
and is known to interact with emotional and cognitive processes. This study
investigated whether interoceptive sensitivity (i.e., heartbeat perception task)
shapes affective and cognitive empathy. Methods: Ninety-three participants were
asked to report the valence of their feelings, as well as the degree of compassion,
arousal, and distress they felt in response to pictures depicting other people in
pain or in nonpain situations. Participants also had to estimate how painful the
situation was. Results: Main results showed that greater interoceptive sensitivity
enhanced the estimated degree of pain (cognitive empathy), as well as arousal
and feelings of compassion (affective empathy), in response to painful pictures.
Conclusions: The accurate p...
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H I G H L I G H T S
• Interoception and empathy share neural circuits such as the anterior insula.
• No prior studies explore whether interoception modulates affective and cognitive empathy.
• We showed that interoception predicts higher cognitive and affective empathy.
• Interoception is relevant to understanding and sharing of other people's emotions.
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Background: Empathy is a basic human ability with affective and cognitive facets and high interindividual vari-
ability. Accurately detecting one's internal body signals (interoceptive sensitivity) strongly contributes to the
awareness of oneself and is known to interact with emotional and cognitive processes. This study investigated
whether interoceptive sensitivity (i.e., heartbeat perception task) shapes affective and cognitive empathy.
Methods: Ninety-three participants were asked to report the valence of their feelings, as well as the degree of
compassion, arousal, and distress they felt in response to pictures depicting other people in pain or in non-
pain situations. Participants also had to estimate how painful the situation was.
Results:Main results showed that greater interoceptive sensitivity enhanced the estimateddegree of pain (cognitive
empathy), as well as arousal and feelings of compassion (affective empathy), in response to painful pictures.
Conclusions: The accurate perception of bodily states and their representation shape both affective and cognitive
empathy. This perception enables us to feel more compassion for another person and to evaluate the pain that
they experience as being more intense.
© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Empathy: deﬁnition
In the eighteenth century, Hume and Smith used the word “sympa-
thy” to refer to the ability to feel as the other person feels. Later, Lipps
[1] used the term “Einfühlung” to describe a formof projection that artists
could use to imaginewhat it would be like to be someone else or to be an
inanimate object. The term Einfühlung (which literally means “feeling
into”) was later translated into “empathy” by Titchener [2]. For Lipps,
sympathy refers to the ability to project oneself onto another (“inner im-
itation”) in order to feel as the other person does. The projection is based
on the perception of an emotional gesture of another person, which
directly activates the same emotion in the perceiver (i.e., emotional
sharing). Nowadays, most deﬁnitions of empathy include an affective
component [3], but there is still no agreement about the exact nature
of the feeling. de Vignemont and Singer [4] argue that empathy occurs
when the observation of the other's emotion induces a similar affective
state in the observer. For Decety and Lamm [5], the affective response
has to result from an “emotional sharing”, while Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright [6] suggest that the affective response does not have to
be similar, but has to be adjusted and appropriate (e.g., feel sad for a
friend who is angry). Finally, Batson [7] states that affective empathy
encompasses any emotion that focuses on the well-being of the
other person and thus refers to empathic concern, which is similar to
compassion.
It has been suggested that, in addition to the affective dimension, em-
pathy also refers to the ability to take the perspective of others [8] and to
understand others' feelings or, more generally, others' points of view [9].
There is now general agreement that the cognitive component of empa-
thy relates to taking the perspective of others in order to understand
and predict others' various mental states (e.g., thoughts, emotions).
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Notably, most research now suggests that empathy is a multidimen-
sional concept that involves an affective and a cognitive subcomponent
[3,10]. Evidence has shown that these subcomponents are associated
and that they inﬂuence each other [3,11,12]. On the basis of these previ-
ous studies, we therefore deﬁne empathy as a multidimensional con-
struct that involves both affective and cognitive components that
refer, respectively, to the ability to share another person's emotional
states and to infer that person's experiential states [4,13].
1.2. Empathy: simulation and perception–action models
According to the most inﬂuential model, i.e. the simulation model,
empathy results from the simulation of another person's state [14]
such that there is a match between the other's emotional state and
the neural/body representations of this state in the empathizer. This
model has been supported by several neuroimaging studies. They re-
vealed the presence of a “shared neural circuit” involving the anterior
insula (AI) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), among other brain
regions, which activate when one experiences pain and when one
observes someone in pain [15,16]. The shared neural circuit is also pro-
posed by the perception–action model, which is based on the existence
of mirror neurons that are activated during the execution and observa-
tion of an action and on the existence of motor representations that
allow us to understand, imitate, or prepare actions [17]. From these
ﬁndings, some theorists [18] have postulated that a similar mechanism
might underlie the empathic responses [18,19]. The perception–action
model suggests that there might be a match between the representa-
tions of the empathizer's emotion and the target such that there is an
unconscious and automatic activation of neural representations of emo-
tional states that are similar to the emotional states of those observed. In
other words, the attention allocated to the other's emotional state acti-
vates the representation of the emotional concept associated with this
emotion [20]. Supporting this hypothesis, several studies have shown
a neural overlap during the observation/decoding of either the experi-
ence or the expression (by imitation or spontaneously) of an emotion
[15,21–25]. For instance, this shared neural circuit has been demon-
strated during empathy for disgust, such that the AI is activated during
the experience of disgust and when observing someone expressing dis-
gust [25]. This overlap has been suggested to underlie the ability of the
empathizer to experience the same feeling as the target's emotion. The
empathizers might then introspect their feeling in order to understand
it, and then attribute this feeling to the other.
1.3. Empathy and interoceptive sensitivity
The perception–action model and the role of the shared neural cir-
cuit in empathy are supported by previous ﬁndings showing that at an
intrapersonal level, the AI is a key structure underlying the ability to
represent the state of the body and to perceive changes arising from
the body as feelings and sensations, referred to as interoceptive sensitiv-
ity (IS [26]). Furthermore, at an interpersonal level, many studies re-
vealed that empathy for pain tasks leads to greater activation in the
AI/ACC [15,22,27] (see [28] for a meta-analysis), and some found that
greater activation in the AI/ACC is associated with reports of stronger
compassion responses (i.e., affective empathy) and higher ratings of
pain intensity (i.e., cognitive empathy) in response to people experienc-
ing pain [15,16].
Taken together, these ﬁndings thus suggest that there may be an in-
terdependence between IS and empathy, speciﬁcally empathy for pain,
such that this shared circuit enables individuals to activate their own
body representations of pain when observing someone in pain, leading
to stronger empathic responses. This hypothesis is in line with Singer
et al.'s [13,15] assumption that impaired access to one's own emotional
state may be associated with impaired simulation of the other's emo-
tional state within the AI, leading to lower empathy. Speciﬁcally, they
argue that because the AI/ACC allows mapping of the representation
of physiological activity predicted to be associated with an emotional
response to a speciﬁc event, AI/ACC activation simulates how another
person will emotionally respond to the same event.
Although the hypothesis about the role of IS in empathy is theoreti-
cally and empirically driven, the empirical evidence remains indirect,
and so far scant direct evidence is available to suggest that empathizing
for someone depends on the level of IS in the empathizer. In relation to
the affective dimension of empathy, previous research showed that
higher IS is associated with a better understanding of one's own emo-
tional experience and with a more intense emotional experience. In-
deed, Herbert and colleagues [29] showed that greater IS is associated
with lower levels of alexithymia. Furthermore, IS contributes to emo-
tional feelings in terms of arousal: greater IS is associated with higher
ratings of arousal [30,31] and with greater heart rate deceleration in re-
sponse to emotional stimuli. Taken together, these studies indicate that
IS and emotional experience are associated with each other. In fact, IS,
the subjective experience of emotions, and cardiovascular arousal are
underlain by similar brain regions (e.g., AI, ACC [30,32]). Thus, increased
activation in these regions could explain the associations between high
IS, low levels of alexithymia, and more intense emotional experience.
To our knowledge, only four studies have investigated the links be-
tween IS and either affective or cognitive empathy. At a behavioral
level, Terasawa et al. [33] found an association between greater IS and
a lower intensity threshold of emotional facial expression, in response
towhichparticipants reported feeling an emotion. In contrast, Handford
et al. [34] failed to ﬁnd an association between IS and performance in
decoding complex mental states expressed by eye gazes. At a neural
level, Ernst et al. [35] showed that the activity of the AI during an affec-
tive empathy taskwas enhancedwhen participantswere required to at-
tend to their heartbeats for a short period. Finally, Fukushima et al. [36]
used heartbeat-evoked potential (HEP) in order to investigate the asso-
ciation between empathy and the brain activity associatedwith the pro-
cessing of the cardiovascular system (HEP) [37]. They showed that the
amplitude of HEP was higher when participants evaluated the valence
of emotional gazes and was positively correlated to higher empathic
concern trait scores. Therefore, although constituting valuable ﬁrst
explorations of possible functional interdependence between IS and
empathy, these studies present some limitations: (1) they focused on
only one of the two dimensions of empathy state (either affective or
cognitive); or (2) they did not directly investigate the level of IS
(i.e., performance) of the participants; or (3) they did not investigate
whether the effects are speciﬁc to empathy or are associated with all
forms of affective experiences (i.e., arousal and distress feelings).
In view of these limitations, it thus appears crucial to further explore
whether IS modulates empathy responses. At a theoretical level, this
study supports the perception–action model such that the activation
of an extensive embodied representation of pain in individuals with
high levels of IS would allow them to better understand the emotional
state of the target and to share it.
1.4. Hypotheses
In this study,we aimed to investigate the inﬂuence of IS (i.e., heartbeat
perception task) on affective and cognitive empathy for someone in pain
and on other forms of affective responses. Regarding affective empathy,
we focused on compassion, which refers to other-oriented and regulated
feelings in response to someone in a negative situation [38]. In terms of
affective but not empathic responses, we focused on feelings of distress,
which are self-oriented and non-regulated feelings [38]. Greater abilities
to regulate emotional responses (measured by an index encompassing
emotional control, emotional and behavioral inhibition, and attentional
focus) are associated with higher ratings of empathic concern, whereas
lower scores on this index are associated with higher reports of distress
[38,39]. Therefore, because Fustos et al. [40] showed that higher IS is asso-
ciated with better regulation strategies, we hypothesized that higher IS is
associatedwith reports of higher compassion and lower feelings of distress
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for people expressing pain. Furthermore, we hypothesized that higher IS
is associated with reports of higher arousal, but not valence, in response
to pain-related stimuli, as shown in previous studies (e.g., [41]). Finally,
because some studies found that greater activation in interoceptive
circuits (AI/ACC) is associated with higher ratings of pain intensity
(i.e., cognitive empathy) in response to people experiencing pain [15,
16], we hypothesized that higher IS modulates the cognitive dimension
of empathy and is associatedwith reports of higher pain intensity ratings.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were recruited on campus andwere screened for health
status using a questionnaire about the participants' medical history.
They were included only if they did not have a history of axis 1 disor-
ders, in particular anxiety disorders or depression according to theDiag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th Ed.). Drug use
(except contraceptives) was not allowed. On the basis of these criteria,
three students were excluded from the study, and 93 (17 male;
MAge = 23.00, SDAge = 4.10) were included. All participants gave their
written informed consent and received 10€ for their participation. The
experiment took place at the University of Potsdam, Department for
Emotion and Motivation Psychology, between April and September
2011. It was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki
and with the approval of the local ethics committee.
2.2. Material
2.2.1. Stimuli
One hundred pictures (50 pain situations, 50 non-pain situations)
from the Potsdam Pain Battery served as stimuli. The Potsdam Pain Bat-
tery consists of pictures of pain situations and non-pain situations col-
lected at the University of Potsdam (unpublished data); the stimuli
have been evaluated using a student sample of 140 participants
(MAge = 23.23, SDAge = 3.66; 30 males), who evaluated the pictures
on a scale ranging from 0 (no-pain) to 9 (pain). Pain pictures depict
painful situations, such as accidents or injuries, and human faces
displaying painful expressions, whereas non-pain pictures consist of
comparable situations in which no person is harmed (Fig. 1). We tried
to match all pain pictures with corresponding non-pain pictures
(e.g., an accident in the kitchen matched with a scene also located in
the kitchen) whenever possible. The pictures were reliably categorized
as either pain or non-pain, as they were evaluated as expressing pain
(M = 6.49; SD = 0.31; min = 6.16; max = 6.83) or no pain (M =
1.29; SD=0.17;min=1.09;max=1.54), respectively. We used pain-
ful pictures for two reasons. First, pain is partly emotional. According to
the International Association for the Study of Pain [42], pain is “an
unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or
potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage”. Second,
observation of pain in another person permits the investigation of affec-
tive (e.g., compassion) and cognitive dimensions (i.e., evaluation of the
intensity of the pain) of empathy. We measured the intraclass correla-
tion coefﬁcient among the 140 participants who took part in the devel-
opment of the battery in order to test interrater reliability. The two-way
random “absolute agreement”model revealed good interrater reliability
for pain (.87) and for non-pain (.84) pictures. All participants (i.e., those
who validated the battery and participants in the present study) were
confronted with the pictures for the ﬁrst time.
2.2.2. Subjective ratings
Valence and arousal: Participants had to report the valence of their
feelings and the degree of arousal they felt in response to the person
in pain or non-pain situations. The ratings were provided by using a
nonverbal pictorial self-report scale, the Self-Assessment Manikin [43].
The ratings given by participants were converted to a numerical scale,
such that the scores ranged from 1 (very unpleasant or low arousing)
to 9 (very pleasant or high arousing).
Estimation of the degree of pain: Participants had to estimate how
painful the situation depicted was from 1 (not painful at all) to 9 (ex-
tremely painful).
Compassion and distress responses: Because pain picturesmay induce
compassion as well as distress responses [27], we decided to measure
both. The ratings were provided by using a German translation of two
adjectives derived from a study by Batson and colleagues [44]. Partici-
pants were asked how compassionate (“anteilnehmend”; compassion)
and how distressed (“bekümmert”; distress) they felt in response to
the person in pain or non-pain depicted in the picture on a nine-point
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely).
2.3. Heartbeat perception task
The participants were seated in a sound-attenuated chamber and
were ﬁtted with physiological recording equipment for heart rate
Fig. 1. Pictures used for pain and non-pain stimuli.
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(electrocardiography). Signals were sampled at 500Hz and analyzed by
a computer-based data acquisition system (AcqKnowledge; BIOPAC
Systems Inc., Santa Barbara, CA).
We measured the IS of the participants by using a heartbeat detec-
tion task [45]. In this task, participants are asked to count their own
heartbeats silently and to verbally report the number of counted heart-
beats at the end of the counting phase. In accordance with the Mental
TrackingMethod [45], therewere four heartbeat counting phases (vary-
ing in length: 15, 25, 35, and 45 s). The beginning and the end of the
counting intervals were acoustically signaled by a beep. IS was estimat-
ed as the mean heartbeat perception score according to the following
transformation [45]:
1 /
4 Σ 1– recorded heartbeats–counted heartbeatsj jð Þ=recorded heartbeatsð Þ:
The mean IS score across all participants was .75 (SD= .11;min=
.48; max= .98).
2.4. Procedure
After the heartbeat perception task, the empathy paradigm consisting
of 100 pictures presented in randomized orderwas started. Order presen-
tation was controlled by the stimulus presentation software, with no
explicit rules deﬁned for the order of display of the 100 images. A single
trial always began with a ﬁxation cross for 500 ms followed by a variable
interstimulus interval of 250–500 ms before a picture was visible for 5 s
(7.5×15 cmor7.5×15 cm). Participantswere then asked to rate valence,
arousal, and the level of compassion and distress they felt whilewatching
the pictures. After a 20-second rating time, the next trial started. The
whole experiment lasted about 1 h.
2.5. Statistical analyses
In order to examine whether ratings of valence, arousal, estimated
degree of pain, and feelings of compassion and distress differed be-
tween pain and non-pain pictures, we used repeated measures analysis
of variance. We conducted hierarchical regression analyses by using
SPSS 17.0, with IS score as the predictor of valence, arousal, estimated
degree of pain, and feelings of compassion and distress in response to
pain and non-pain pictures, after controlling for age and sex (0 =
male; 1 = female). Finally, we used a test for skewness and for kurtosis
(cut-offs: −1, +1) to examine the normality of the distributions. All
factors were normally distributed, as all values were close to zero for
skewness (−0.71 to 0.64) and for kurtosis (−0.74 to 0.68), except for
compassion in response to pain pictures (skewness=− .98; kurtosis=
1.96) and for the evaluation of pain intensity for non-pain pictures
(skewness = 1.39; kurtosis = 1.18). Therefore, these two variables
were transformed in order to normalize their distribution (compassion
in response to pain pictures was squared because the residuals present-
ed a left skew [skewness = 0.10; kurtosis = 0.14]; pain intensity of
non-pain stimuli was log-transformed because the residuals presented
a right skew [skewness = 1.03; kurtosis =−0.09]).
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive data
Table 1 demonstrates that, relative to non-pain pictures, pain pic-
tures were evaluated as more negative, more arousing, and as express-
ing more pain; they also led to reports of higher compassion and
distress.
3.2. Painful pictures
Table 2 demonstrates that a high IS score predicted reports of higher
arousal, compassion, and estimation of the intensity of pain, but did not
predict valence (FModel(3, 87) = 0.40; p N .05) and distress responses
(FModel(3, 87) = 0.72; p N .05). Across all models, sex and age made no
signiﬁcant unique contribution (all ps N .05). Higher IS is thus likely to
predict reports of higher arousal and compassion, as well as evaluation
of the pain as being more intense.
3.3. Non-pain pictures
Regression analyses revealed a signiﬁcant model, with being a fe-
male predicting greater estimated intensity of pain (β = − .32; t =
−3.04; p b .005; FModel(3, 90) = 3.37; p = .02; R2 = .10). No other
models were signiﬁcant (ps N .43). The statistical analysis revealed
that relative to male participants, female participants evaluated the
pain expressed in non-pain pictures as being more intense.
4. Discussion
The aim of the study was to investigate whether IS modulates em-
pathic responses to observing someone's pain. We also aimed to inves-
tigate the effect of IS on affective responses not speciﬁc to empathy. In
this study, we examined whether IS, i.e., performance in the heartbeat
detection task, modulates subjective responses to pain and non-pain
pictures.More speciﬁcally, participantswere asked to report the valence
of their feelings, as well as the degree of compassion, arousal, and dis-
tress they felt in response to pictures depicting other people in pain or
in non-pain situations. Participants also had to estimate how painful
the situation was. Regarding empathy, we hypothesized that relative
to those with a low IS score, those with a high IS score would report
higher compassion and greater evaluation of the intensity of another
person's pain. Regarding affective but not empathic responses, we hy-
pothesized higher IS to be associated with reports of higher arousal
and reports of lower distress. The results of this study demonstrated
that higher IS is associated with reports of higher estimation of the in-
tensity of pain (cognitive empathy) and with higher reports of compas-
sion (affective empathy) and arousal, but not distress, in response to
someone in pain. In terms of empathy, the present ﬁndings support
our hypotheses and provide new evidence for the relevance of the per-
ception of bodily signals, i.e., IS [35,36]. Moreover, this study is in line
with previous ﬁndings showing reports of higher arousal in response
to emotional stimuli in participants with higher IS (e.g., [31]). At an af-
fective level, our ﬁndings thus suggest that the inﬂuence of IS on emo-
tional responses goes beyond arousal to also concern feelings of
compassion. At a cognitive level, we conﬁrmed that interoception may
modulate pain intensity ratings (i.e., cognitive empathy) in response
to people experiencing pain [15,16].
The idea that bodily states and their representations shape emotion
and cognition is a core characteristic of embodied cognition theories
[46,47]. According to Barsalou [46], embodied representations of motor,
somatosensory, affective, and interoceptive information have an impor-
tant role in emotion and cognition. Internal states and knowledge
acquired from introspection (i.e., the ability to be aware of having a per-
sonal experience) and interoception are as important as external experi-
ence for affective and cognitive processes. Several studies demonstrate
Table 1
Descriptive data of valence, arousal, estimated intensity of pain, and feelings of compas-
sion and distress in response to pain and non-pain pictures.
Pain pictures Non-pain
pictures
F(1, 92)
Mean SD Mean SD
Valence 3.11 0.94 6.27 1.32 358.64⁎
Arousal 5.75 1.31 3.56 1.59 113.68⁎
Estimated intensity of pain 6.94 1.01 1.52 0.72 1641.50⁎
Compassion 6.26 1.43 4.12 1.90 70.72⁎
Distress 5.62 1.20 1.45 0.44 1221.20⁎
⁎ p b .001.
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that IS is a relevant variable for explaining interindividual differences in
emotional and cognitive situations. Indeed, higher IS was associated
with more intense feelings and higher activation of underlying brain
structures during emotional stimulation [26,31,48]. Moreover, IS was
also associated with cognitive functions such as selective attention or
self-regulation during physical exercise [49,50]. IS may thus modulate
the relationship between bodily responses and affective and cognitive
variables. Taking these lines of evidence into account, we suggest that
the affective and the cognitive dimensions of empathymight bemodulat-
ed by differences in IS. Although the supposed association between
interoception and empathy is appealing, empirical evidence has been
lacking. This study is the ﬁrst to demonstrate that IS modulates the affec-
tive and cognitive dimensions of empathy for pain.
In relation to the embodied representations of pain, it has been
shown that witnessing someone's pain leads to an enhancement of
physiological responses [51] and that empathy in pain tasks leads to
greater activation in the AI/ACC [15,22,27,28]. Moreover, some studies
found that greater activation in the AI/ACC is associated with reports
of higher compassion and of higher ratings of pain intensity in response
to people experiencing pain [15,16]. This suggests that observing some-
one in pain might activate the visceral representations of pain in the
observer. Furthermore, an association has been shown between high
IS and enhanced sensitivity and decreased tolerance to pain induced
by a pressure algometer [52] (for nonsigniﬁcant association between
IS and thermal and distension pain sensitivity see [53,54]). This was
interpreted by the authors as an activation of interoceptive representa-
tions of pain. Therefore, the present ﬁndings might be accounted for by
more extensive embodied (visceral) representations of pain in high IS
(versus low IS), which is reactivated when observing someone's pain,
leading to greater emotional and cognitive empathy.
At a theoretical level, although our ﬁndings are restricted to empa-
thy for pain, they support the perception–action model, which suggests
a match (imitation) between the state of the other person and the
representations of this state in the empathizer [18]. According to this
theory, there is an unconscious and automatic activation of neural rep-
resentations of the state in the empathizer that are similar to those of
the state that is observed. In other words, the empathizer resonates
with the target's emotional state by synchronizing (imitating) his/her
own representations with those of the target. The activation of these
representations primes, or generates, the somatic responses associated
with the state. In the present study, this would have allowed high IS
scorers to better understand the emotional state of the target and to
share their pain.
The ﬁndings of this study also support the importance of the social
context of the pain experience [55]. According to the communication
model of pain [56], the way that people perceive and respond to others'
pain (i.e., avoid or support) can be affected by the characteristics of the
sender (e.g., catastrophizing), by the observer (e.g., accuracy of the rec-
ognition of pain), and by contextual factors (e.g., relationship between
the sender and the observer) [56]. Our ﬁndings thus conﬁrm the
importance of the observer characteristics, i.e., IS, in the pain experience
[57] and these ﬁndings more broadly support its social dimension [55].
Regarding the underlying factors, our results—that people with high
IS reported higher compassion and did not report more personal dis-
tress than did those with low IS—suggest that participants with higher
IS may present a more effective emotion regulation capacity. It has
been shown that emotion regulation is associated with greater reports
of compassion and with lower reports of distress [38,39] and that reap-
praisal of negative pictures leads to greater modulation of neural activ-
ity in those with high IS than it does in those with low IS [40]. Although
emotion regulation abilities were not measured in our study, we might
hypothesize that it is because those with high IS report higher arousal
and present higher emotion regulation abilities that they report more
compassion than do those with low IS. Okun et al. [38] showed that
compassion feelings are associated with greater reports of dispositional
negative emotional intensity and emotion regulation. Alternatively,
reports of higher compassion and no difference in terms of reports of
personal distress in those with high IS may simply represent better dis-
tinction between oneself and others. Self/other distinction refers to the
ability of two persons interacting together to preserve their individual-
ity and to disentangle their own feelings from the feelings shared with
the other [5]. Therefore, higher levels of self/other distinction allow us
to distinguish between our emotions and those of others and may
thus directly impact empathic responses. This allows us to know that
the other person is the source of our affective state and to recognize
that our perspective is different from the perspective of others. The abil-
ity to knowwho is actually feeling an emotion might thus impact affec-
tive responses.More precisely, higher self/other differentiation is linked
with a higher level of empathic concern, and lower differentiation with
a higher level of distress [5]. Regarding the association between IS and
self/other differentiation, the modulation of body ownership illusions
by IS [58] supports the idea that good heartbeat perceivers can more
easily distinguish themselves from others (and therefore, presumably,
another person's pain from their own). Therefore, it would be reason-
able to expect that good self/other distinction is associated with more
empathy but less personal distress, accounting for the present positive
association between IS and compassion.
Some methodological and statistical constraints have to be consid-
ered. First, the ﬁndings do not provide evidence about causal direction
of interoception on empathy. Ernst et al. [35] investigated the causal re-
lationship between attending to one's own heartbeats for a short period
and the activity of the AI during a subsequent affective empathy task.
However, they did not directly investigate the level of IS and thismanip-
ulation had no inﬂuence at a behavioral level. This suggests, therefore,
that future studies are needed to better understand the causal role of
IS on empathy. Second, as highlighted in the introduction, several deﬁ-
nitions of empathy coexist, especially regarding its affective dimension.
Although our hypotheses were based on the perception–action model,
according to which simulation of the state of others leads to emotional
sharing, we have focused on feelings of compassion and not on
Table 2
Regression coefﬁcients for relationships among sex, age, interoceptive sensitivity, and responses to pain pictures.
Beta t R2 FModel R2Change FChange
Arousal Sex .10 0.99 .03 F(2, 88) = 0.28
Age − .10 −0.95
IS .25 2.33⁎ .09 F(3, 87) = 2.71⁎ .06 F(1, 87) = 5.43⁎
Estimated intensity of pain Sex .03 0.35 .02 F(2, 88) = 1.12
Age − .15 −1.53
IS .43 4.37⁎⁎ .20 F(3, 87) = 7.26⁎⁎ .18 F(1, 87) = 19.08⁎⁎
Compassion Sex − .01 −0.09 .06 F(2, 88) = 2.70
Age .18 −1.93
IS .44 4.62⁎⁎ .25 F(3, 87) = 9.33⁎⁎ .19 F(1, 78) = 21.36⁎⁎
Note. IS = interoceptive sensitivity.
⁎ p b .05.
⁎⁎ p b .001.
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emotional sharing (i.e., the negative affect associatedwith painful expe-
rience). This is an important limitation, as the differences between these
two affective responses have recently been highlighted at subjective
[59] and neural levels [60]. Furthermore, although interoceptionmodu-
lates subjective reports of empathy, physiological evidence of intensity
of emotional response to pain stimuli has not been recorded. Future
studies should thus go beyond subjective reports and enlarge the pres-
ent ﬁndings to emotional sharing and its physiological correlates. Third,
studies should also investigate whether the association between IS and
empathy will generalize to empathy for emotions other than pain
(e.g., sadness). Furthermore, using low (arousal) pain stimuli might
have been a better control condition than the pictures we used. Our re-
sults suggest that IS may impact only high negative arousal and not low
arousal pictures. This thus supports the necessity for future studies to
vary only the arousal of stimuli (i.e., high pain versus low pain). Finally,
we did not measure the pain that was experienced by the participants,
which may have primed the body representation of pain, especially
among those with high IS. This could then have inﬂuenced the effect
of IS on subjective responses. Valeriani et al. [61] showed, in support
of the importance of one's own current body perception, that when ob-
serving someone in pain, neural activation depends on the intensity of
the pain experience that is triggered in the observer. Future studies
should thus investigate the effect of this possible confounding factor.
5. Conclusion
This study showed that IS modulates affective and cognitive empathy
and thus substantially extends, at an interpersonal level, former research
underscoring the relevance of interoception for the intensity of emotions,
as well as emotion and cognitive processing [31,48,62]. From the deﬁni-
tion that empathy is characterized by affective (i.e., compassion feelings)
and cognitive (i.e., identiﬁcation of other's state) dimensions, we have
demonstrated for the ﬁrst time that both affective and cognitive empathy
are shaped by interindividual differences in the ability to perceive internal
signals.
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